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Strategy & Policy

Rebalancing the Rebalance
Michael Spangler
Abstract: Since late 2011, the United States has pursued a policy
of “rebalancing toward Asia,” taking steps to expand its already significant role in the region. However, Washington has failed to check
– and may have unwittingly provoked – new Chinese measures to
erect multiple layers of security around contested areas in the South
and East China Seas. The United States should, therefore, consider
new bilateral security initiatives with China and its neighbors to ensure security cooperation catches up with economic cooperation in
the dynamic Asia-Pacific rim.

“If names be not correct, language is not in accordance with the truth of
things. If language be not in accordance with the truth of things, affairs
cannot be carried on to success.”
Confucius, Analects 13.3

B

eginning in late 2011, the Obama Administration unveiled its
intention to rebalance US military, diplomatic, and economic
efforts to the Asia-Pacific region. Initially described as a “pivot,”
this term was subsequently changed to “rebalance,” to describe more aptly
the repositioning of mainly military assets from a then 50-50 percent to
a 60-40 percent split, favoring the Asia-Pacific over the Atlantic side of
the world by 2020.1 In President Obama’s November 2011 address to
the Australian parliament, he emphasized the US policy goal is to ensure
“the United States will play a larger and long-term role in shaping [the
Asia-Pacific] region and its future.”2 In practice, the Asia-Pacific theater
was slated to gain a rotational US Marine Corps detachment (already
deployed to Australia) and an additional US carrier group: one aircraft
carrier, seven destroyers, ten littoral combat ships, and two submarines,
along with reconnaissance assets.3
In contrast to the limited permanent-base approach of the 1980s,
the US military rebalance relies upon rotational deployments through
several host-nation port facilities.4 As Commandant of the Marine
Corps General James Amos explained, dispersing US forces beyond a
few large bases makes them a harder target for ballistic missiles.5 In

1      Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, “Shangri-La Security Dialogue,” Speech at the Shangri-La
Hotel in Singapore, June 2, 2012, http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1681.
2      The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by President Obama to the
Australian Parliament,” November 17, 2011.
3     Prem Mahadevan, Strategic Trends 2013: Key Developments in Global Affairs (Zurich: Eidgenössische
Technische Hochschule, 2013), 51, http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/Strategic-Trends2013-EastAsia.pdf.
4      J. Taylor Rushing, “Pentagon: No need for rotational troops as US aids Philippines
after Haiyan,” Stars and Stripes, November 12, 2013, http://www.stripes.com/
pentagon-no-need-for-rotational-troops-as-us-aids-philippines-after-haiyan-1.252563.
5      Zachary Keck, “Marine Corps Chief: Not Sure About Asia Force Posture,” Thediplomat.
com,February 12, 2014. .
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addition, rotational deployments are more cost-effective by using air
travel to rotate military personnel, while the power of the rebalance is
augmented by US foreign military sales to the region.6
Scholars such as Christopher Layne have relabeled the US rebalancing strategy as “off-shore balancing” - an attempt to contain the rise of
a potential hegemon, such as China, by relying on global and regional
power balances to attain that goal. As Layne explains:
•• Economic limitations are pushing the United States to reset priorities,
withdrawing and downsizing its forces in Europe and the Middle East
and concentrating its military power in East Asia.
•• By reducing its military footprint in the Middle East, the United
States may decrease the incidence of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism
directed against it. Safeguarding the free flow of Persian Gulf oil can
be ensured largely by naval and air power.
•• America’s comparative strategic advantages rest on naval and air
power, not land power, to manage security issues in Asia.
•• Off-shore balancing is a strategy of burden-sharing with Pacific Rim
allies to protect freedom of navigation in East Asia. 7
Consistent with the above interpretation, the US Defense Strategic
Guidance announced in January 2012 the United States will no longer
size its forces for long-term, prolonged stability operations (such as
those in Iraq and Afghanistan) while projecting power in areas that are
challenged by “asymmetric means,” notably, anti-access and area-denial
environments in the South and East China Seas.8
Close on the heels of President Obama’s announcement, US
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton amplified the importance of the AsiaPacific region, where half of the world’s population resides, indicating
its development is vital to American strategic and economic interests.
As she noted:
Open markets in Asia provide the United States with unprecedented
opportunities for investment, trade, and access to cutting-edge technology. Strategically, maintaining peace and security across the Asia-Pacific is
increasingly crucial to global progress, whether through defending freedom
of navigation in the South China Sea, countering the proliferation efforts
of North Korea, or ensuring transparency in the military activities of the
region’s key players.

The rebalance strategy, as described by Clinton, proceeds along six tracks:
(1) strengthening bilateral security alliances; (2) deepening America’s
relationships with emerging powers such as China; (3) engaging with
regional multilateral institutions; (4) expanding trade and investment;

6      Michael Fabey, “U.S. Leads International Defense Aircraft Suppliers In Asia Pacific,”
Aviation Week, November 26, 2013, http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/
awx_11_26_2013_p0-640906.xml
7      Christopher Layne, “The (Almost) Triumph of Off-shore Balancing,” National Interest, January
27, 2012.
8      Catherine Dale and Pat Towell, In Brief: Assessing the January 2012 Defense Security Guidance
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, August 13, 2013), 2, http://www.fas.org/sgp/
crs/natsec/R42146.pdf.
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(5) forging a broad-based military presence; (6) and advancing democracy and human rights.9
The rebalance to the Asia-Pacific thus demonstrates US leadership,
acknowledges the economic importance of the region, and highlights
freedom of navigation and military transparency as strategic goals. In
light of such comprehensive, transparent, and compelling security justifications, one might ask whether the rebalance has had the salutary
effect of assuring friendly and allied countries while deterring China as
a potential adversary in the region?
This paper argues the regional shaping benefits of the rebalance
have not yet materialized, and odds remain low they can be realized in
the absence of new efforts. In particular, China has become increasingly
assertive of its claims to disputed maritime territories in the East and
South China Seas, and remains committed to a relatively high rate of
military spending to project its power into the region in the coming
years. At the same time, some countries, notably US allies, Japan and
the Philippines, have become more vocal in their objections to Chinese
maritime claims and more convinced of their need for American military support as maritime disputes unfold. Indeed, US allies appear to
perceive the rebalancing as designed to put them on a more equal footing
to resolve their disputes with China -- and not leave them to face rising
Chinese power alone.10 It is therefore incumbent on Washington to
manage the contradictory aims of the rebalancing strategy more effectively: militarily bolstering allies while fostering peaceful cooperation.

Phase One: 2011-2012
Rebalancing Perceived as Military
From late 2011 through 2012, the United States took the following
concrete steps to implement its rebalancing initiative:
•• Created a new Pentagon office, the Air-Sea Strategy Office, in
November 2011, to refine the concept of a new joint air-sea battle
(first broached in 2009) to counter anti-access, area-denial operations,
principally in the Pacific.11
•• Announced new troop deployments to Australia, new naval deployments to Singapore, and new military cooperation with the Philippines;
•• Emphasized American military presence in the Asia-Pacific would be
increased, become more broadly distributed, flexible, and politically

9      Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy, November 2011. Her policy statement appears to have been partly influenced by Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo’s assertion at the May 2010 US –China Strategic and Economic Dialogue that South China Sea maritime
claims were one of his country’s “core interests.” See Greg Sheridan, “China Actions Meant as a
Test, Hillary Clinton Says,” The Australian, November 9, 2010, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/
national-affairs/china-actions-meant-as-test-hillary-clinton-says/story-fn59niix-1225949666285.
10      J. Kugler and D. Lemke, Parity and War: Evaluations and Extensions of the War Ledger (Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996) discusses the likelihood of conflict between states sharing a perceived parity or balance of power.
11      Stephen Glain, “The Pentagon’s New China War Plan,” Salon, August 13, 2011, http://www.
salon.com/2011/08/13/sino_us_stephen_glain/.
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sustainable;12
•• Made progress in negotiations to form a multi-national Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP) free trade agreement.13
Most countries in East and Southeast Asia were publicly receptive
to a stronger US commitment to the Asia-Pacific region. Regional
powers such as Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia took pains, however,
to avoid choosing sides between the United States and China. On the
other hand, the Philippines, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore
explicitly welcomed greater US presence in the region. Tellingly, the
Philippines, along with Vietnam, remain embroiled in a protracted,
intense dispute with China over maritime and territorial claims in the
South China Sea. Singapore as a small city-state, and Japan, Taiwan and
South Korea as long-standing allies appear to have embraced the US
initiative as a stabilizing influence in the region.14
China’s initial reaction to the rebalance initiative was carefully
measured in official media and harshly critical in non-official media.
Many unofficial commentators, including military academics, asserted
the United States had unveiled the initiative as a new post-Cold-War
conspiracy to “contain” China as a rising power, and heir-apparent to
the former Soviet Union, as a potential adversary of the United States.
Indeed, some commentators argued this “conspiracy” could eventually
align China and Russia more closely together in joint economic and
defense efforts to mitigate US-led containment efforts.15 To date, most
Chinese bloggers remain vociferously nationalistic and critical of the US
rebalancing policy, although government-employed commentators may
be covertly shaping this ostensibly public phenomenon.16

Phase Two: Defanging the Rebalancing Initiative

In the lead-up to and aftermath of their June 2013 summit, Presidents
Barack Obama and Xi Jinping ushered in a new phase of the initiative
characterized by repeated calls for moderation. Chinese officials noted
there were “no fundamental, structural, or irreconcilable differences”
between the two countries. Chinese military leaders also stressed that,
as the rebalancing initiative evolved, the United States has placed less

12      Thomas Donilon, “America is Back in the Pacific and will Uphold the Rules,” Financial Times,
November 27, 2011.
13      The twelve negotiating countries are Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia,
Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam. Some countries expressing
interest in TPP include South Korea, Taiwan, Philippines, Colombia, and Costa Rica. China, despite
its initial opposition, has more recently shown interest in considering eventual TPP membership.
Vicki Needham, “China’s Interest Grows in Joining an Asia-Pacific Trade Deal,” The Hill, September
17, 2013.
14      Robert G. Sutter, et al., Balancing Acts: The U.S. Rebalance and Asia-Pacific Stability (Washington,
DC: George Washington University: Sigur Center for Asian Studies, August 2013), 2. Also see
Alexander C.-C. Huang, “Taiwan in an Asian “Game of Thrones,” National Bureau of Asian Research,
Asian Policy No. 15 (January 2013): 18-19.
15      In fact, China and Russia concluded a long-sought natural gas deal and conducted joint military exercises in disputed waters off the coast of Japan this May. See Timothy Heritage and Vladimir
Soldatkin, “Putin Looks to Asia as West Threatens to Isolate Russia,” Reuters, March 21, 2014, and
“China Media: ‘Rise of Russia’,” BBC, March 20, 2014.
16      Simon Shen and Shaun Breslin, On-line Chinese Nationalism and China’s Bilateral Relations
(Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010), 257.
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emphasis on military initiatives and on China as a focus for the US
policy.17
Partly reflecting these moderating influences, People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) Major General Zhang Zhaozhoung described China’s
growing military activity in the South and East China Seas as a “cabbage
strategy” in a May 2013 television interview.18 This strategy seems
aimed at “defanging” the rebalancing policy by putting in place concentric circles of Chinese fishing boats, fishery administration ships,
maritime enforcement vessels, and warships (resembling a layer-by-layer
cabbage wrap) around disputed maritime areas in the China Seas. The
goal of the strategy is to assert China’s sovereignty over these areas via
a slow accumulation of small incremental changes, none of which in
itself constitutes a casus belli but together substantiate China’s claims of
sovereignty over the long term.
Another way to look at this strategy is to imagine a Chinese game
of weiqi, the popular Asian game of black-and-white pieces in which two
opposing players strive to surround the other. China’s July 2012 establishment of Sansha City on a Paracel island seized by force from Vietnam
in 1974 was the precursor of its new weiqi games with the Philippines and
Japan. Repeated Chinese navy standoffs with Philippine Coast Guard
vessels at Scarborough Reef from 2012 to 2013, and its imposition of
an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the Japanese-claimed
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in November 2013, are recent moves in these
games. China’s imposition of its ADIZ prompted South Korea, in
turn, to expand its own ADIZ into Japanese and Chinese ADIZs in
December 2013.19 Clearly, the busy East Asian coastal seas, with their
presumed underwater natural resources, are becoming hot points of
potential military conflict.
Indeed, as Robert Ross predicted in late 2012, the rebalancing
initiative has become a self-fulfilling prophecy, whereby US policy
“unnecessarily compounds Beijing’s insecurities and feeds China’s
aggressiveness, undermines regional stability, and decreases the possibility of cooperation between Beijing and Washington.”20

Phase Three: 2014-? Uncertainty

To address China’s concerns and to strengthen the cooperative
engagement, Brookings Institution fellows Jonathan Pollack and Jeffrey
Bader made several US policy recommendations in January 2014:
•• Ensure budget cuts do not affect the rebalance;
•• Complete Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations in the first half of

17      Robert G. Sutter, et al., Balancing Acts: The U.S. Rebalance and Asia-Pacific Stability (Washington,
DC: George Washington University: Sigur Center for Asian Studies, August 2013), 2.
18     Robert Haddick, “America has no answer to China’s Salami-slicing,” War on the Rocks , February
6, 2014, http://warontherocks.com/2014/02/america-has-no-answer-to-chinas-salami-slicing.
19      David Lai, “A Few Questions about China’s Air Defense Identification Zone and its
Aftermath,” US Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute, March 21, 2014, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/A-Few-Questions-About-Chinas-Air-DefenseIdentification-Zone-and-Its-Aftermath/2014/03/21
20      Robert Ross, “The Problem with the Pivot: Obama’s New Asia Policy Is Unnecessary and
Counterproductive,” Foreign Affairs 91, no. 6 (November-December 2012): 70–82.
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2014 and support China’s eventual entry;
•• Encourage China’s economic reforms by, inter alia, completing a bilateral investment treaty with China by 2016;
•• Support Japanese security efforts while urging Prime Minister Abe
to avoid stirring up fractious historical issues that undercut Japanese
relations with China and South Korea;
•• Support negotiation of a code of conduct in the East and South China
Seas to de-escalate territorial disputes.21
Unfortunately, events since the publication of their Brookings
article put in doubt the likelihood most of their policy prescriptions will
be implemented in the near term. On the budgetary front alone, US
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Katrina McFarland has
stated the rebalance was being reconsidered in light of budget pressures.22
Chinese commentators also asserted the US budget sequestration begun
in 2013 will likely prevent the United States from committing enough
resources to the rebalancing, thereby transforming the initiative into a
“strategic retreat.”23 Indeed, Pacific Air Forces Commander General
Herbert J. Carlisle has acknowledged resources have not yet been made
available to key elements of the policy due to other commitments.24
Just as important, President Obama’s State of the Union Speech in
January 2014 did not mention Asia-Pacific issues ranging from SinoJapanese tensions to larger concerns over maritime disputes and the
potential for an East Asian arms race. US Secretary of Defense Hagel’s
April 2014 visit to Beijing, however, did prominently acknowledge those
tensions. Secretary Hagel criticized China for unilaterally establishing
its ADIZ in the East China Sea without conferring with Japan and its
other neighbors. “That adds to tensions, misunderstandings and could
eventually add to, and eventually get to, a dangerous conflict,” Hagel
noted, while emphatically wagging his finger in a joint press conference
with Defense Minister and PLA General Chang Wanquan.25 PLA Major
General Zhu Chenghu, a military academic, later dismissed Hagel’s
remarks as “groundless,” suggesting the United States believes “whatever the Chinese do is illegal, and whatever the Americans do is right.”26
In the lead up to Secretary Hagel’s visit, China decided to exclude
Japan from the international fleet review of the upcoming PLA-hosted
Western Pacific Naval Symposium, bringing together Pacific-rim countries. Since Japan will not participate in the fleet review, the United
States has also decided not to take part in a show of support, according
21      Jonathan D. Pollack and J.A. Bader, “Return to the Asia Rebalance,” Brookings
Research Paper, January 23, 2014. http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/01/
asia-rebalance-us-china-relationship-pollack-bader
22      Zachary Fryer-Biggs, “DoD Official: Asia Pivot ‘Can’t Happen,” Gannett Government
Media, Defense News, March 4, 2014.
23      Feitao Liu, “Obama’s Rebalancing to the Asia Pacific,” China Institute of International Studies
Journal, September 4, 2013, http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2013-09/04/content_6272923.htm
24      Aaron Mehta, “Interview: Gen. Hawk Carlisle, Commander, US Pacific Air Forces,” Gannett
Government Media, DefenseNews, February 10, 2014,.
25      Donald Nissenbaum, “U.S.-China Defense Chiefs Trade Barbs over Regional Ambitions,”
Wall Street Journal, April 8, 2014.
26      Fox News, “Chinese General Warns that U.S. is Making ‘Important’ Mistakes in the
Region,” Wall Street Journal By-line, May 31, 2014, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2014/05/31/
chinese-general-warns-that-us-is-making-imporant-mistakes-in-region/.
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to press reports.27 These events do not bode well for casting the Western
Pacific Naval Symposium as a venue for working out an acceptable
code of military practice to manage potential conflicts in the region. A
number of years ago, the Western Pacific Naval Symposium developed a
voluntary Code for Unalerted Encounters at Sea. However, the Chinese
have refused to accept any revisions to it, even though they acknowledge
their use of parts of it. China takes exception to the use of the word
“Code” in the title since it implies a “legally binding force.”28 Moreover,
the Code for Unalerted Encounters at Sea does not address other basic
issues although it constitutes a good start to defusing potential confrontations between navy fleets.29
As President Obama embarked on his April 2014 trip to Japan,
Korea, Malaysia, and the Philippines, the official Chinese Xinhua news
agency underscored Beijing’s sensitivity about his stops in Tokyo and
Manila: “The United States should reappraise its anachronistic hegemonic alliance system and stop pampering its chums like Japan and the
Philippines that have been igniting regional tensions with provocative
moves.”30 To date, Chinese media have chosen to spotlight these “hegemonic” US defense treaty obligations rather than equally firm American
enjoiners for the disputants to settle their maritime claims peacefully.31 Just as important, press coverage by US allies has failed, so far, to
highlight American emphasis on peaceful dispute-settlement. Instead,
foreign media dwell on the rebalancing strategy as leaving military
options on the table to counter China’s long-term intentions. Chances
for miscalculation and conflict have, therefore, risen on both sides. It
is striking that shortly after President Obama returned to Washington,
Vietnam issued a stiff warning to Beijing about new Chinese oil drilling
moves near the Paracel Islands; and Chinese vessels reportedly rammed
Vietnamese vessels in those waters, provoking anti-Chinese riots in Ho
Chi Minh City’s foreign investment area.32

Rebalancing the Rebalance?

Against the backdrop of rising tensions in the East and South
China Seas, Chinese scholars generally expect the United States to
delay or slow down the military rebalance in order to accommodate
US budgetary strictures and to preserve enough strategic military assets
to address seemingly chronic problems in Eastern Europe, the Middle
East, and Northeast Asia. Professor Liu Feitao of the China Institute of
International Studies argues the United States may increasingly focus on
an “economic rebalancing” effort, such as expanding the Trans-Pacific

27      H. Cooper, “In a Test of Wills with China, the U.S. Sticks up for Japan,” New York Times, April
6, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/07/world/asia/hagel-asia.html?_r=0.
28      Anthony Bergin, “Maritime Incidents at Sea,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute blog, March
2013. http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/reader-response-maritime-incidents-at-sea/.
29      CUES is inadequate because China asserts that military activities in its Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ) are subject to its approval. Until China agrees that its EEZ is not to be treated as territorial water, CUES is irrelevant, offering only a partial solution.
30      Deng Yushan, “Dynamic Asia needs U.S. to reshape anachronistic policy,” Xinhua News
Agency, April 23, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2014-04/23/c_133282220.
htm.
31      J. Eilperin, “President Obama Affirms U.S. Will Stand By Treaty Obligations to Japan,”
Washington Post, April 24, 2014.
32      Deutsche Welle, “Vietnam Protests China Drilling for Oil in Disputed Waters Near Paracel
Islands,” May 5, 2014; C. Doan and T. Fuller, “Foreign Factories in China Weigh Damage in antiChina Riots,” New York Times, May 14, 2014.
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Partnership and promoting military sales, to help sustain a scaled-back
effort.33
At the same time, Liu maintains the United States “will increasingly
try to control Asian territorial disputes through legal means and multiple
channels.” Highlighting Washington's unsuccessful attempt to ratify
the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea during President
Obama’s first term, Liu predicts US policy:
...will undertake similar [multilateral] efforts and bring legality into the forefront of dispute intervention. The United States will try to turn multilateral
mechanisms like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
Defense Ministers Meeting-Plus and the East Asia Summit into acceptable
platforms to discuss territorial disputes.34

It is likely Chinese policy makers will continue to reject US efforts
to promote multilateral fora and international norms as means to work
out China’s emerging maritime disputes in the Asia-Pacific. Beijing
is, so far, rigidly committed to addressing these disputes “reasonably
and peacefully” with its neighbors only on a bilateral basis. Chinese
leaders also seem adamant about refusing to recognize the “authority”
or “expertise” of international bodies, such as the international arbitration panel currently reviewing the Sino-Philippines dispute as a result of
a unilateral Philippine request in early 2013.35 Few Chinese academics,
military or otherwise, are swimming against this tide and calling for a
critical reappraisal of China’s bilateral approach.36

A New Initiative

Given this apparently intractable stalemate, the United States should
consider encouraging its treaty partner, the Philippines, to take the lead
in launching bilateral negotiations with Beijing on the resolution of
conflicting maritime claims in the South China Sea. The United States
should no longer insist on multilateral fora and legalistic platforms
against which China harbors deep suspicions regarding their fairness
and track record.37 Indeed, since China’s land border disputes with its
neighbors have largely been worked out, through bilateral talks, Beijing
is highly likely to hew to what it knows. China may calculate it can exert

33      Feitao Liu, “Obama’s Rebalancing to the Asia Pacific,” China Institute of International Studies
Journal, September 4, 2013, http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2013-09/04/content_6272923.htm.
34      Ibid. Also see Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s article, “Securing the Rule of Law at
Sea,” Project-Syndicate, June 2, 2014. Prime Minister Abe advocates the use of ASEAN’s 2002
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea as a multilateral basis for resolving
maritime issues.
35      The International Court of Arbitration comprises more than 100 members from about 90
countries; http://www.iccwbo.org/about-icc/organization/dispute-resolution-services/icc-international-court-of-arbitration/. Peter A. Dutton, “The Sino-Philippine Maritime Row,” Center for
New American Security, East and South China Sea Bulletin, no. 10 (March 15, 2013): 2.
36      This stance could change in the future, if Chinese academics believe China’s defense has
succeeded in gradually strengthening its maritime claims and altering the international order to its
benefit. At present, however, Chinese elites generally reject the “international order” as a set of
rules created by the victors of World Wars I and II without meaningful Chinese (and developing
world) input.
37      Interestingly, China has (1) recognized the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea as the
key legal framework applicable in the Arctic and (2) acknowledged the “sovereign rights” of Arctic
littoral states there, the latter apparently consistent with China’s own maritime claims in the East and
South China Seas. See J. Kapyla and H. Mikkola, “The Growing Arctic Interests of Russia, China,
the U.S., and the European Union,” Finnish Institute of International Affairs Paper no. 133, August
2013, http://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/347/the_global_arctic/.
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finer control over such negotiations, in terms of both content and pace,
by conducting them on a bilateral basis.38
For its part, Manila may wish to supplement its ongoing arbitration
case with a bilateral negotiation approach to demonstrate its commitment to the peaceful resolution of its maritime disputes. In an effort
to establish consistent standards and precedents to serve as the basis
for resolving other disputes, the Philippines could also exchange notes
regularly on its negotiations with China and its neighbors. This measure
will ensure the talks can inform and encourage other countries to initiate similar measures in the future. It is key that Manila’s talks not
give Beijing any preponderant advantage by isolating or leveraging the
Philippines against other disputants. In other words, this weiqi-like
diplomatic negotiation can be completed as China’s future negotiation
partners consult with each other.
An information-sharing approach to Sino-Philippine talks would
also help ensure the terms of the agreement (including the delimitation of
maritime borders and resource exploitation) are worked out consistently,
while checking off necessary security objectives, ranging from protocols
for military and law enforcement encounters at sea to the establishment
of procedures and hotlines for military exercise notifications and the
avoidance of military confrontation. Other countries such as Vietnam,
Japan, and South Korea may later elect to pursue similar negotiations
with China, to resolve inter-connected defense and resource management issues just as critical to their own economic development and to
foreign relations with their neighbors.39
In addition, separate Sino-American talks could aim to avoid
another “USS Cowpens” situation in which Chinese and US military
vessels nearly collided in the South China Sea in December 2013.40 A
US defense official underscored the importance of establishing communication protocols to prevent such accidents in the future: “Sustained
and reliable communication mitigates the risk of mishaps, which is in
the interest of both the United States and China.”41 In short, China,
the United States and their Pacific-rim neighbors can jointly pursue Sun
Tzu’s dictum, “To be prepared for any contingency is the greatest of
virtues.”42
38      Malaysia follows a bilateral course with China and appears committed to accommodating
China’s maritime claims while pursuing cooperative initiatives with China including joint maritime
exercises beginning in 2014. Vietnam has, so far, had mixed results in pursuing bilateral talks with
China, both sides having agreed on their land border and maritime rights in the Gulf of Tonkin,
but not on the sensitive Paracel and Spratly Islands disputes. See K. Bradsher, “China and Vietnam
at Impasse over Oil Rig in South China Sea,” New York Times, May 12, 2014. As a result, Vietnam
is considering the filing of an international arbitration case against China, similar to that submitted
by the Philippines in 2013. K. Kwok, “China Wants to Avoid Court over Maritime Disputes, Says
Vietnam Official,” South China Morning Post, June 2, 2014.
39      In the absence of any meaningful progress on maritime issues, Japan, the Philippines, and
Vietnam could begin to cooperate more closely on defensive measures in the South China Sea. See
“Australia backs U.S., Japan against China,” Inquirer Global Nation, June 3, 2014. However, implementing such defensive measures should be preceded by utilizing both bilateral and multilateral
diplomatic means to explain the measures to China and to seek a peaceful resolution. H.B. Minh
and B. Blanchard, “China Scolds Vietnam for Hyping Up South China Sea Oil Rig Row,” Yahoo
News, June 18, 2014.
40      Carl Thayer, “USS Cowpens Incident Reveals Strategic Mistrust between the U.S. and
China,” The Diplomat, December 17, 2013.
41      Ibid.
42      Sun Tzu, “The Art of War,” Art of War blog, 2001, http://www.artofwar.net/suntzu/quotes.
html.
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Managing Blow-Back

The US sponsorship of Sino-Philippine talks concerning South
China Sea raises some serious questions. First, would such a US action
undermine US preference for multilateral negotiations and frameworks?
Does such a bilateral strategy ultimately play into the hands of a rising
China seeking to use its growing economic clout to impose its will on
small countries by dividing and overwhelming them in serial order?
Finally, would the bilateral approach be interpreted by China as a sign of
US weakness in standing by its treaty partners in East Asia? Some critics
would answer these questions affirmatively, arguing Washington should
eschew a bilateral approach and simply stay the course in deterring
Beijing by accelerating the implementation of military rebalancing measures coupled with a more vigorous definition of US treaty obligations.
The basic answer to these criticisms is Washington and its partners
can and should accommodate several complementary initiatives in their
effort to pursue a peaceful resolution of East and South China Sea disputes. By reviewing China’s concerns in bilateral fora, the United States
and its partners open new avenues capable of leading to a break-through
in the resolution of these disputes. Moreover, progress on the bilateral
front does not undermine, deny, or contradict any multi-lateral or international framework, but rather creates new opportunities to bring those
organizations and platforms into the talks and to incorporate them into
bilaterally accepted decisions. Such progress does not signal a lack of
resolve on the parts of the United States and its allies -- but a flexibility
to exhaust all possible channels before imposing specific red-lines that
could trigger the use of military power.

Conclusion

To maintain the momentum of its rebalancing policy, the United
States must help bridge the growing impasse between American-led
multilateral and Chinese bilateral efforts to resolve Asian-Pacific maritime disputes. Indeed, it may also be vital for the United States to recast
the strategic thrust of its rebalancing initiative. Sino-American progress
on key issues has been made over the past few decades by pursuing a
constructive, systematic engagement process that works through issues
on a flexible, cooperative, and pragmatic basis. Drawing on this historical theme of “constructive engagement” means recasting the inherent
thrust of the rebalance – harnessing it to the purpose of "catching up"
security cooperation with economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific.43
In this way, the rebalancing initiative may be better labeled as “keeping
pace” to match international security cooperation with robust economic
activity within the Pacific Rim.
It is far from an easy task for the United States to persuade the
Philippines and other regional actors to enter into a complicated bilateral
talks with China. Such talks will require Washington to walk a tightrope
between Realpolitik and normative diplomacy, the former characterized
by bilateral agreements and the latter by calling for international integration within a multilateral approach. Throughout, Washinton will
need to emphasize both the inviolability of its treaty obligations to its

43     “Clinton Defends Constructive Engagement of China,” All Politics, October 24, 1997, http://
www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1997/10/24/clinton.china/.
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allies and the value of accepted international legal norms, as Pacific Rim
nations are encouraged to conclude inter-locking bilateral maritime
arrangements with China.
Bilateral talks may evolve over time into trilateral ones with the
United States encouraging parties to stay on a constructive track and
avoid increased tensions and hostility. American support could assure
allies they risk little -- and may make more headway -- by acknowledging
China’s reluctance to engage with multilateral institutions. The alternative to this tri-bilateral hybrid approach seems both short-sighted and
dangerous: pursuing a waiting game that juxtaposes growing military
forces, posits mutually exclusive economic interests, fuels nationalistic
over-reactions, and inadvertently risks a new arms race hampering the
development of the Asia-Pacific region as a whole.

